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The Implications of Retained and Distributed Earnings for Future Profitability and Market 
Mispricing 
Abstract: In this paper, we investigate the informational content of retained and distributed 
earnings for future profitability and market mispricing.  We find that investors act as if the 
components of retained earnings (current operating accruals, non current operating accruals 
and  retained  cash  flows)  have  similar  implications  for  future  profitability,  leading  to  an 
overvaluation  of  their  differential  persistence.  They  also  do  not  distinguish  between  the 
distinct  properties  of  distributed  earnings,  correctly  anticipate  the  persistence  of  net  cash 
distributions to debt holders (net debt repayment) and underestimate the persistence of net 
cash distributions to equity holders (dividends minus net stock issues). Our evidence suggests 
that the accrual anomaly documented in the accounting literature and the anomaly on net 
stock issues documented in the finance literature could be a subset of a larger anomaly on 
retained earnings.  Overall, our findings on the sources of this anomaly, indicate that it is 
primary  attributable  to  investor’s  limited  attention  or  limited  cognitive  power  on 
understanding managerial empire building tendencies and managerial violation of accounting 
principles.  
 
Keywords:  retained  earnings,  distributed  earnings,  accruals,  net  stock  issues,  earnings 
management. 
 
JEL classification: M4  3 
1.  Introduction 
 
In  a  seminal  paper,  Sloan  (1996)  shows  that  the  accrual  component  of  earnings 
exhibits lower persistence than the cash  flow component  of  earnings. He also shows that 
investors  fail  to  fully  understand  the  differential  persistence  of  accruals  and  cash  flows.  
Investors  tend  to  overweight  (underweight)  accruals  (cash  flow)  when  forming  earnings 
expectations only to be systematically surprised when accruals turn out to be less persistent 
than  cash  flows,  especially  around  future  earning  announcement  time.  As  a  result,  low-
accruals firms earn higher abnormal returns than high-accrual firms. 
Subsequent  research  decomposes  accruals  into  different  components  or  considers 
broader definitions of accruals and tries to provide some explanations on the accrual anomaly.  
Using Jones (1991) model, Xie (2001) shows that discretionary accruals predict returns, but 
the nondiscretionary component does not. Thomas and Zhang (2002) report that the abnormal 
returns  to  the  accruals  trading  strategy  are  largely  generated  by  extreme  changes  in  the 
inventory.  Fairfield, Whisenant and Yohn (2003a) argue that the accruals anomaly is a subset 
of a broader anomaly related to investors’ inability to impound information about growth.
1 
This  paper  extends  the  existing  literature  in  three  aspects.    First,  instead  of 
concentrating  on  the  accrual  component  of  earnings  as  in  Sloan  (1996),  we  study  the 
persistence  and  pricing  of  every  component  of  earnings.    Our  analysis  begins  with  an 
extended  decomposition  of  earnings  into current  operating accruals, non-current  operating 
accruals, retained cash flows, earnings (cash flows) that are distributed to debt holders, and 
earnings (cash flows) that are distributed to equity holders.  We then group the first three 
components of earnings into retained earnings and the last two components of earnings into 
distributed earnings because we find that investors price the first three components similarly 
and  the  last  two  components  similarly.
2  In  particular,  investors  tend  to  overweight 
(underweight) retained  earnings (distributed earnings) when forming earnings  expectations 
only to be systematically surprised when retained earnings turn out to be less persistent than 
distributed earnings. 
Second, given our decomposition of earnings into five components, we examine the 
relation among those components.  In particular, we pay close attention to the low persistence 
of accrual and retained earnings and the high persistence of distributed earnings to equity 
holders. Distributed earnings to equity holders are defined as dividends plus stock repurchases 
                                                 
1 Some other studies on accruals include Beneish and Vargus, 2002; Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Zach, 
2005; Ng, 2005; Khan, 2006; Richardson, Sloan, Soliman and Tuna, 2005, and 2006. 
2 Dechow, Richardson and Sloan (2006) examine the persistence and pricing of free cash flows by 
decomposing them into three components.  While they use a sample period from 1950 to 2003, we use 
a sample period from 1962 to 2003 because the Compustat data prior to 1962 suffers from survivorship 
bias (see Fama and French 1992 and Sloan 1996).   4 
minus stock issues (or net stock issues).  The finance literature on net stock issues suggests 
that returns after stock repurchase are high (Ikenberry, Lakonishiok, and Vermaelen 1995), 
and returns after stock issues are low (Loughran and Ritter 1995). Daniel and Titman (2005) 
and Pontiff and Woodgate (2006) show that there is a negative relation between net stock 
issues  and  equity  returns.
3   With  our  decomposition  of  earnings,  we  are  able  to  examine 
whether  the  accruals  anomaly  is  directly  linked  with  the  net  issues  anomaly.    To  our 
knowledge, this is the first paper in examining the relationship between the accrual (retained 
earnings) anomaly and the net stock issues anomaly in a unified framework. 
Third, we consider the source of the above-mentioned results on retained earnings.  
For  this  purpose  we  decompose  retained  earnings  into  their  discretionary  and  non 
discretionary portions, using the  model  of Chan, Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (2006, 
“CCJL 06” hereafter) that is based on sales growth. The discretionary portion captures the 
impact of managerial manipulation while the non discretionary portion captures the impact of 
business  conditions.  An  increase  in  sales  can  potentially  be  coupled  with  an  increase  in 
inventories,  accounts  receivable,  cash  and  fixed  assets  raising  the  nondiscretionary 
component of retained earnings.  Therefore the results from this decomposition should shed 
lights on the growing literature on earnings quality. 
Our results suggest that that there are systematic differences in the persistence among 
the  distinct  components  of  retained  earnings  and  between  the  distinct  components  of 
distributed  earnings.  Accruals  have  lower  persistence  and  investors  overweight  them, 
consistent with previous findings. Even though retained cash flows have higher persistence 
than  accruals,  investors  overestimate  it  as  well.  In  particular,  investors  act  as  if  the 
components of retained earnings have similar implications for future profitability, leading to 
an overvaluation of their differential persistence. For distributed earnings, investors do not 
distinguish between each component of distributed earnings, correctly anticipating the lower 
persistence of cash distributions to debt holders but underestimating the higher persistence of 
cash distributions to equity holders. Thus, investors overestimate the overall lower persistence 
of retained earnings and underestimate the overall higher persistence of distributed earnings.  
The  former  is  consistent  with  that  of  the  findings  in  the  accrual  anomaly.  The  latter  is 
consistent with the “net stock issues” anomaly in the finance literature if we interpret that the 
anomaly  on the  cash  distribution to  equity  holders (defined as dividends  minus net stock 
issues) can capture the anomaly on “net stock issues”.   
A hedge strategy taking a long (short) position in firms that report low (high) retained 
earnings generates positive abnormal returns. In particular, the return to the strategy is equal 
to 15.6% and positive in 36 of 40 years examined. In addition, the return to a hedge strategy 
                                                 
3 Fama and French (2006) have an examination of the net issues anomaly.   5 
taking  a  long  (short)  position  in  firms  that  report  high  (low)  cash  distributions  to  equity 
holders is equal to 9.2% and positive in 32 of 40 years examined. However, our results on the 
relation of the two anomalies suggest that the anomaly on retained earnings largely subsumes 
the anomaly on distributions to equity holders, casting doubts on the independence of the net 
stock issuances anomaly found in the finance literature if the anomaly on the cash distribution 
to equity holders can capture the anomaly on “net stock issues”.  Additional tests also show 
that in the presence of retained earnings, total accruals lose their ability to indicate the degree 
to which investors overestimate the sustainability of current earnings performance.  
We find that abnormal returns are earned only from a hedge portfolio strategy taking 
a long (short) position on low (high) discretionary retained earnings. On the other hand, a 
hedge portfolio strategy on non discretionary retained earnings does not generate significant 
abnormal  returns.    This  result  supports  the  earnings  quality  explanation  on  the  accrual 
anomaly. However, at the same time we find a potentially important role in some cases for the 
interaction  between  the  two  hypotheses  in  the  generation  of  abnormal  returns.  Thus,  our 
results do not completely rule out the role of managerial earnings management.  
Our findings have several implications for the existing literature. First, they give a 
distinct role to retained earnings. This has not been emphasized in previous research, where 
earnings are typically decomposed into accruals and free cash flows.  Our results suggest that 
the level of retained earnings is a more comprehensive measure of investor overestimation 
about  the  sustainability  of  current  earnings  performance  than  the  level  of  total  accruals. 
Second,  we  provide  empirical  support  to  the  hypothesis  that  cash  distributions  to  equity 
holders  are  possibly  responsible  for  the,  previous  documented,  underestimation  of  the 
persistence of the cash component of earnings.  In summary, the results in this paper show 
that the anomaly on distributed earnings to equity holders (net stock issues) documented in 
the finance literature may be a manifestation of a larger anomaly on retained earnings. With 
all the above taken together one can argue that to the extent that the two anomalies are closely 
related, they are more likely to arise from investor's limited attention or limited understanding 
on discretionary decisions made by managers.
4  
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly reviews 
the literature on the persistence and pricing of the accrual and free cash flow components of 
earnings.  Section  3  provides  a  detailed  description  of  our research  design  concerning  the 
implications  of  retained  and  distributed  earnings  for  future  profitability  and  market 
mispricing. In section 4 we present data, sample formation, variables measurement while in 
section 5 we provide our empirical results. Section 6 summarizes and concludes. 
                                                 
4 Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) has a discussion about the effect of investors’ limited attention and 
limited processing power.   6 
 
2.  Literature Review 
 
Numerous studies have provided a variety of interpretations of Sloan (1996) work on 
the accrual anomaly. The anomaly has two parts: why accruals have lower persistence than 
the free cash flow component of earnings, and why investors are unable to recognize that fact. 
Studies in the existing literature can be divided in two broad categories on the basis of the 
approach they adopt. The first set of studies, builds on Sloan’s (1996) subjectivity conjecture.  
In particular, Xie (2001), De Fond and Park (2001) and Kothari (2001) interpret Sloan (1996) 
results  as  evidence  of  manipulation  of  accruals  in  earning  process,  with  the  implicit 
assumption that managers exploit discretionary (abnormal) accruals to manipulate earnings. 
Thomas and Zhang (2002) find that it is driven by inventory accruals while Beneish and 
Vargus (2002) report that it is driven by income-increasing or positive accruals. Moreover, 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) conclude that the lower persistence of accruals is attributable to 
their transitory estimation  error. In addition, Richardson, Sloan, Soliman and Tuna (2005, 
“RSTT 05” hereafter) draw a link between Sloan’s (1996) notion of subjectivity and the well-
known  concept  of  reliability.  Specifically,  they  provide  a  comprehensive  definition  and 
categorization of accounting accruals in which each accrual category is rated according to its 
reliability and they document that less reliable accruals leads to lower earnings persistence 
and  that  investors  do  not  fully  anticipate  this  earnings  persistence,  leading  to  significant 
security mispricing.  
The second set of studies adopts the viewpoint that the differential persistence and 
mispricing  of  accruals  is  applied  more  broadly  to  firm’s  business  conditions  (growth  or 
correlated economic characteristics with firm growth). Specifically, Fairfield, Whisenant and 
Yohn (2003a, “FWY 03a” hereafter) find that the lower persistence of the accrual component 
of earnings is a special case from a more general negative relation between future earnings 
performance and growth in net operating assets.  They suggest that this relation arises from 
conservative bias in accounting or from the lower rate of economic profits associated with 
diminishing marginal returns to new investment opportunities, or both. Moreover, they find 
that market appears to equivalently overprice accruals and growth in non current operating 
assets and conclude that the accrual anomaly documented in Sloan (1996) is a subset of a 
larger growth (in net operating assets) anomaly. In follow-up research, Fairfield, Whisenant 
and Yohn (2003b, “FWY 03b” hereafter) argue that the lower persistence relative to cash 
flows  is  driven  by  growth  in  investment  base  that  is  not  matched  by  growth  in  income. 
Variants of this economic explanation are embraced in Cooper, Gulen and Schill (2005) to 
interpret the negative relation of growth in total assets with future stock return and in Titman,   7 
Wei and Xie (2004) and  Anderson, Garcia-Feijoo (2006) studies to interpret the  negative 
association of capital expenditures and future stock returns. In addition, recent research by 
Zach (2005), Ng (2005), Khan (2005) focuses on economic variables associated with firm 
growth  to  interpret  Sloan’s  (1996)  results.
5 In  particular,  Zach  (2005)  argues  that  the 
mispricing  of  accruals  is  attributable  to  various  corporate  events  such  as  mergers  and 
divestitures, Ng (2005) that it is a compensation for default risk and Khan (2006) that it is 
subsumed by a four factor model motivated from ICAPM. 
In  follow  up  research,  Richardson,  Sloan,  Soliman  and  Tuna  (2006,  “RSTT  06” 
hereafter) decompose accruals into a “growth” and an “efficiency” component and find that 
both  components  contribute  to  the  lower  persistence  of  accruals,  with  the  efficiency 
component having the strongest relation. Their main conclusion is that temporary accounting 
distortions provide the most compelling explanation for the lower persistence of the accruals. 
However, “RSTT 06” document that they can rule out a supplementary role for explanations 
related to firm’s business conditions, such as diminishing marginal returns to new investment. 
Finally, “CCJL 06”, consistent with “TZ 02”, finds that Sloan’s (1996) results are related to 
inventory accruals. They also decompose working capital accruals into their discretionary and 
non  discretionary  portions  based  on  their  relation  with  sales  and  find  that  the  associated 
mispricing  is  primary  attributable  to  earnings  management.  However,  consistent  with  the 
explanation  related  to  firm’s  business  conditions,  “CCJL  06” also  find  positive  abnormal 
stock returns for portfolio strategies on accounts payable accruals. 
  Previous  research  has  focused  more  on  analyzing  the  informational  content  of 
accruals for future profitability and market mispricing than that of free cash flows. Dechow, 
Richardson and Sloan (2006, “DRS 06” hereafter) conducts a detailed investigations of the 
persistence and pricing of the free cash flow component of earnings by decomposing them 
into three distinct categories: retained cash flows (applied to the firm’s cash balance), cash 
flows distributed to debt holders (applied for debt financing) and cash flows distributed to 
equity  holders  (applied  for  equity  financing).  “DRS  06”  demonstrates  that  the  higher 
persistence of cash component of earnings is due to cash applied for equity financing. They 
find  that  stock  prices  act  as  if  investors  correctly  anticipate  the  implications  of  cash 
distributions to capital providers (cash that is applied for debt and equity financing) for future 
profitability and overestimate the persistence of cash that is applied to the firm’s cash balance. 
While  most studies treated accruals and free cash flows as relatively homogenous 
component  of  earnings,  this  paper  examines  the  idea  that  the  well-documented  accrual 
anomaly is consistent with a general market mispricing of retained earnings.   
 
                                                 
5 Zach (2005), Ng (2005) and Khan (2005) have considered in their analysis only current operating 
accruals following Halley (1985) and Sloan (1996) definition of accruals.   8 
3.  Research Design 
 
  Halley  (1985)  defined  accruals  as  growth  in  working  capital  less  depreciation 
expense.
6 This definition is narrow since it focuses on working capital accruals relating to 
current net operating assets and ignores accruals relating to non-current net operating assets. 
FWY  03a”  and  “FWY  03b”  incorporate  in  their  analysis  accruals relating  to  non-current 
operating assets, but label them as a generic form of growth. Subsequent research by “RSST 
05”, “DRS 06” and “RSST 06” point out that accruals relating to non-current operating assets 
are also accounting accruals and developed a more comprehensive definition of accounting 
accruals. In our analysis, current operating accruals  t CACC   are defined as growth in net 
current  operating  assets  (net  working  capital) t NWCA ∆ ,  non  current  operating 
accruals t NCACC
7 as  growth  in  net  non  current  operating  assets  t NNCOA ∆  and  total 
accruals  t TACC  as growth in net operating assets t NOA ∆ : 
To understand better the above measures of accruals, it is useful to distinguish total 
equity  t TE   into net operating assets t NOA  and net financial assets t NFA :  
t t t NFA NOA TE + =                                                                   (1) 
The most common financial asset is cash holdings (cash and short investments)  t C  and the 
most common financial liability is total debt, which is defined as the sum of short-term debt 
t STD  and long-term debt t LTD . Therefore, net financial assets t NFA  are equal to: 
t t t t LTD STD C NFA − − =                                                    (2) 
Change  in  financial  assets  is  defined  as  change  in  cash  holdings  and  change  in  financial 
liabilities is defined as net financial expense (interest expense minus interest income)  t NFE  
minus  cash  flows  distributed  to  debt  holders  (reduction  in  short  and  long  term  debt) 
t D DIST _ . Therefore, growth in net financial assets t NFA  is equal to:  
) _ NFE ( t t t t D DIST C NFA − − ∆ = ∆                                      (3) 
We also distinguish growth in net operating assets into growth in net working capital assets 
and  net  non  current  operating assets and  get the following  expression for growth  in total 
equity:   
t t t t t D DIST NFE C TE _ NNCOA NWCA t + − ∆ + ∆ + ∆ = ∆                                             (4) 
Recall also the standard clean surplus equation:  
                                                 
6 This  definition  is  closely  related  with  the  definition  of  operating  accruals  used  in  the  FASB’s 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standard Number 95 “Statement of Cash Flows’ 
7 This definition of accruals differs slightly from the accrual definition used in “RSTT 05” and “RSTT 
06” studies in that it considers investments and cash advances.   9 
  t t t E DIST NI TE _ − = ∆                                          (5) 
where: 
•  t NI : Net Income at time t. 
•  t E DIST _ : Cash flows distributed to equity holders at time t. 
Substituting  equation  (4)  to  the  clean  surplus  equation  and  assuming  that  net  financial 
expense is paid in cash we get: 
t t t t t t
t t t t t
E DIST D DIST C NCACC CACC NI
E DIST D DIST C NNCOA NI
_ _
_ _ NWCA t
+ + ∆ + + = ⇔
⇔ + + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ =
                    (6) 
With  the  above-extended  decomposition  of  net  income  we  begin  our  empirical 
analysis regarding the persistence and valuation of the components of retained and distributed 
earnings. Net income will be also decomposed into total retained earnings by aggregating 
current operating accruals, non current operating accruals and retained cash flows and into 
total distributed earnings by aggregating cash flows distributed to debt holders and equity 
holders:.   
t t t DIST RE NI + =                                            (7) 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper in the existing literature that uses the 
above  two  decompositions  as  basis  for  empirical  analysis.  Prior  research  focused  on  the 
decomposition of net income into total accruals and into total free cash flows: 
t t t FCF TACC NI + =                                            (8) 
We organize our hypothesis tests into four groups.  First, we compare the persistence 
of  each component of the net  income. Second, for the pricing tests, we  examine  whether 
information about the persistence of these components is reflected in stocks prices using the 
Mishkin framework (1983).  Thirdly, we investigate whether retained earnings reflects more 
information than total accruals about the degree to which the sustainability of current earnings 
performance provokes excessive investor optimism. Finally, we examine the source of the 
anomaly  on  retained  earnings  by  decomposing  them  into  their  discretionary  and  non 
discretionary portions using the model of “CCJL 06” 
Let us develop our hypotheses carefully.  Starting, with the components of retained 
earnings,  we  predict  that  high  current  and  non  current  operating  accruals  indicate  low 
sustainability  of  current  earnings  performance  since  they  are  often  derived  from  earnings 
management.  Earnings  management  can arise  from  the  violation  of  accounting  rules  with 
respect to the nature, timing and magnitude of revenues and expenses recognition or from 
empire building incentives. In the first case, high current and non current operating accruals 
may arise as managers violate accounting principles to shift reported income from the future 
to the present and vice versa while in the second case as they over-invest. However, even if   10 
managers do not manage earnings, high current and non current operating accruals contain 
adverse information about firm’s business conditions such as diminishing marginal returns to 
increased investment.    
For retained cash flows, their impact for future profitability is ambiguous. On the one 
hand, high retained  cash flows  may  have  low persistence if they are  derived by  earnings 
management (accounts receivables securitizations, transfers in and out of trading securities, 
delay of payments to suppliers). High retained cash flows may also have a negative impact on 
future profitability since they could be associated with future overinvestment (Jensen, 1986; 
Blanchard, Rhee and Summers, 1993; Richardson, 2006)
8.  On the other hand, according to 
capital rationing theory high cash holdings enable managers to make optimal investment with 
less  cost  and  obtain  better  future  profitability  (Myers  and  Majluf,  1984).
9  Thus,  the 
implications of retained cash flows for future profitability are not clear. However, we predict 
that they have higher persistence relative to current and non current operating accruals due to 
their higher reliability and their lower measurement error.  
For distributed earnings, earnings (cash flows) distributed to debt holders are net debt 
(principal) repayments and earnings (cash flows) distributed to equity holders typically are 
dividends minus net stock issues.  Cash flows distributed to debt holders are subject to firms’ 
financing need and debt financing are typically drawn before firms do equity finance. Even 
though  managers  could  increase  or  reduce  dividends  and  decide  on  share  repurchases  to 
signal  higher  future  earnings  performance  (Bartov,  1991;  Fenn  and  Liang,  2001),  firms 
seldom lower dividends due to the negative signal to the market.  Thus, we expect a higher 
persistence  for  cash  distributions  to  equity  holders  relative  to  cash  distributions  to  debt 
holders.  
We  now  turn,  to  our  hypothesis  regarding  the  valuation  by  the  market  of  the 
differential persistence of the components of earnings. Most of past research is in agreement 
that investors overestimate the persistence of accruals, however there is no discussion about 
how investors perceive retained cash. Therefore, we conjecture that, if investors with limited 
attention  to  earnings  management  or  business  conditions  do  not  distinguish  among  the 
components of retained earnings, they could overestimate their differential persistence, thus 
not only the persistence of accruals but also the persistence of retained cash.  In a similar 
fashion we formulate a hypothesis about the market valuation of distributed earnings. Our 
conjecture  now  is  that  investors  with  limited  attention  would  treat  homogeneously  the 
                                                 
8 Jensen  (1986)  documents  that  high  cash  holdings  enable  managers  to  act  opportunistically  and 
indulge in “value-destroying activities” and to “over-invest and misuse the funds”. Blanchard, Rhee 
and Summers (1993) and Richardson (2006) suggest that managers of firms with high cash holdings 
tend to waste them in negative NPV projects.  
9 Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that high cash holdings can benefit a firm by reducing the cost of 
asymmetry that places a wedge between the costs of internal and external capital.   11 
components of distributed earnings, underestimating the persistence of cash distributions to 
equity holders (dividends minus net stock issues) since its persistence is higher than that of 
cash distribution to bond holders. 
The predicted negative association of retained earnings with future abnormal stock 
returns could be consistent with investor’s inability to understand earnings management or 
firm’s business conditions. In order to provide additional evidence on the role of these two 
competing hypotheses in explaining the anomaly on retained earnings, we decompose them 
into their non discretionary and discretionary portions. For this purpose, we use the model of 
“CCJL 06” that is based on sales growth. An increase in sales for example, give rise to current 
operating assets, non current operating assets, cash and cash equivalents, thereby raising the 
non  discretionary  component  of  retained  earnings.  Thus,  if  the  anomaly  is  driven  from 
investor’s  limited  attention  on  adverse  information  about  firm’s  business  conditions,  then 
abnormal returns should be earned only on the non discretionary portion of retained earnings 
that is related to sales growth. On the other hand, if the anomaly is driven from investor’s 
limited  attention  on  earnings  management,  then  only  the  discretionary  portion  that  is 
unrelated to sales growth should generate abnormal returns. However, we examine also the 
contribution of an interaction term between the two portions in the prediction of abnormal 
returns, since  we recognize that the two  hypotheses  might  not be  mutually  exclusive and 
probably co-exist.  
 
4.  Data, Sample Formation and Variable Measurement.  
 
Our  empirical  tests  are  conducted  using  data  financial  statement  data  from  the 
Compustat annual  database and  monthly stock return data from CRSP monthly files. The 
CRSP  file  provides  data  on  NYSE  and  AMEX  firms  from  1926,  while  the  Compustat 
database provides data on a similar population from 1950. However, we eliminate pre-1962 
observations since the Compustat data prior 1962 suffers from survivorship bias (Fama and 
French, 1992; Sloan, 1996) and therefore, our sample covers all firm-year with available data 
on  Compustat  and  CRSP  for  the  period  1962-2003.  Moreover,  we  exclude  all  firm  year 
observations  with  SIC  codes  in  the  range  6000-6999  (financial  companies)  because  the 
discrimination  between  operating  and  financing  activities  is  not  clear  for  these  firms. 
Furthermore, we require as in Vuolteenaho (2002) all firms to have a December fiscal year 
end,  in  order  to  align  accounting  variables  across  firms  and  obtain  tradable  investment 
strategies  for  our  subsequent  portfolio  assignments.  Finally,  we  eliminate  firm  year 
observations with insufficient data on Compustat to compute the primary financial statement 
variables  used  in  our  tests.  These  criteria  yield  final  sample  sizes  of  150.896  firm  year 
observations with non missing financial statement and stock return data.   12 
Earnings are defined as one-year ahead annual net income (Compustat data item 18). 
Moreover,  we  use  the  indirect  method  (balance  sheet)  method  to  measure  the  primary 
financial statement variables as follows: 
∆ = t CACC [(item 4 – item 1) – (item 5 – item 34)] 
∆ = t NCACC  [(item 6 – item 4) – (item 181 – item 5 – item 9)] 
t t t NCACC CACC TACC + =   
t C ∆  = ∆(item 1) 
∆ − = t D DIST _ (item 34 + item 9 ) 
= t E DIST _ item 18 - ∆(item 6 – item 181) 
t t t t E DIST D DIST C FCF _ _ + + ∆ =  
t t t t C NCACC CACC RE ∆ + + =  
t t t E DIST D DIST DIST _ _ + =  
  Consistent with previous research, earnings are deflated by contemporaneous average 
total  assets,  converting  them  into  return  on  assets  (an  income  measure  to  a  profitability 
measure). Moreover, each component of earnings is deflated by contemporaneous average 
total assets and then is winsorized at +1 and –1 in order to eliminate the influence of extreme 
outliers.    In  particular,  we  conduct  the  winsorization  on  t CACC ,  t NCACC ,  t C ∆ , 
t D DIST _ ,  t E DIST _ and then aggregate them to construct  t TACC ,  t FCF , t DIST ,  t RE , 
t NI .
10 
The  annual  one-year  ahead  raw  stock  returns  1 + t RET  are  measured  using 
compounded 12-month buy-hold returns inclusive of dividends and other distributions from 
the  CRSP  monthly  files.    We  require  at  least  a  four-month  gap  between  the  portfolio 
formation month and the fiscal year end (e.g. December – May) to ensure that investors have 
financial statement data prior to forming portfolios.
11 Then, size-adjusted returns  1 + t ARET  
are calculated by deducting the value weighted average return for all firms in the same size-
matched decile, where size is measured as the market capitalization at the beginning of the 
return cumulation period. The size portfolios are formed by CRSP and are based on size 
deciles of NYSE and AMEX firms. If a firm is delisted during our future return window, then 
the CRSP’s delisting return is considered for the calculation of the one-year ahead raw stock 
                                                 
10 The results are qualitatively similar without winsorization. However, the winsorized results have 
lower standard errors. 
11 Alford , Jones and Zmijewski (1994) argue that four months after the fiscal year end, all firm’s 
financial statement data are publicly available.     13 
return, and any remaining proceeds are re-invested in the CRSP value-weighted market index. 
This mitigates concerns with potential survivorship biases. If a firm is delisted during our 
future return window as a result of poor performance (delisting codes 500 and 520-584) and 
the  delisting  return  is  coded  as  missing  by  CRSP,  then  a  delisting  return  of  -100%  is 
assumed.
12 
5.  Results 
 
5.1  Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 reports univariate statistics for key variables that are organized around the 
decompositions of earnings. The mean of current operating accruals, non-current operating 
accruals,  total  accruals,  retained  cash  flows  and  retained  earnings  are  (0.013),  (0.045), 
(0.058), (0.004) and (0.061) respectively.  The median values are (0.008), (0.025), (0.044), 
(0.001) and (0.049) respectively. These positive mean and median values indicate that the 
firms have been growing their asset bases by retaining earnings during the sample period. 
However, the mean values of cash flows that are distributed to debt-holders, cash flows that 
are distributed to equity holders and distributed earnings are (-0.027), (-0.022), and (-0.049) 
respectively.  The  median  values  of  those  variables  are  (-0.002) and  (-0.006) respectively. 
These negative mean and median values indicate that the firms have been growing their asset 
bases by raising new capital during the sample period. Overall, firms have been growing by 
retaining earnings and raising new capital. The standard deviations of retained earnings and 
distributed earnings are (0.233) and (0.195) respectively. For the standard deviation of the 
components of retained earnings, non-current operating accruals have the highest standard 
deviation  (0.158),  followed  by  retained  cash  flows  (0.127) and  current  operating  accruals 
(0.105).  Hence,  the  total  variation  in  retained  earnings  is  not  dominated  by  one  of  its 
components.  Furthermore,  the  standard  deviation  of  earnings  that  are  distributed  to  debt-
holders and equity holders are (0.134) and (0.141) respectively, indicating that total variation 
of distributed earnings is not dominated by one of its components. In summary, we can argue 
that each component of earnings represents an economically significant source of variation in 
total earnings. 
Table 2 presents pair-wise (Pearson) correlations for earnings and its components.  
There is a negative correlation between retained and distributed earnings (-0.652). Focusing 
on  the  components  of  retained  earnings,  the  negative  correlation  of  non-current  operating 
accruals  with  distributed  earnings  (-0.59)  is  much  stronger  than  that  of  current  operating 
                                                 
12 Note that we replicate all results by eliminating these firms from the sample or following Shumway 
(1997) and assuming delisting return of -30% or assuming a zero delisting return. Our results remain 
qualitatively similar with respect to these three alternative procedures.   14 
accruals (-0.264) and retained cash flows (-0.18). This finding implies that the strong negative 
correlation between retained and distributed earnings is mainly due to non-current operating 
accruals.  Moreover, the correlation of cash flows distributed to debt-holders with retained 
earnings (-0.538) is stronger than that of cash flows distributed to equity holders (-0.352). In 
addition, retained  earnings are  more  highly correlated  with  non-current operating accruals 
(0.716) and retained cash flows (0.522), than with current operating accruals (0.461). These 
correlations  indicate  that  current  operating  accruals,  non-current  operating  accruals  and 
retained cash flows represent significant sources of variation in retained earnings. 
Table  3  reports  descriptive  statistics  of  selected  financial  characteristics  of  decile 
portfolios formed by sorting firms on the magnitude of retained earnings.  Firms are ranked 
annually and assigned in equal numbers to portfolios (deciles). Numbers in Table 3 are time 
series averages of yearly mean and median values. Panel A of table 3 reports the portfolio 
mean (median) values for total earnings, retained earnings, distributed earnings, total accruals, 
and  free  cash  flows.  It  shows  that  earnings  performance  is  positively  related  to  retained 
earnings since the mean (median) value of total earnings is -0.145 (-0.112) for the lowest 
portfolio and 0.057 (0.060) for the highest portfolio. Retained earnings vary from about a 
mean (median) of -0.231 (-0.182) in the lowest decile to 0.442 (0.393) in the highest decile. 
Distributed  earnings,  vary  from  about  a  mean  (median)  of  0.086  (0.073)  in  the  lowest 
portfolio to -0.340 (-0.307) in the highest portfolio. There is also an increasing trend in total 
accruals and a decreasing trend in free cash flows across deciles.  
Panel B and C of table 3 report results on the components of retained earnings and 
distributed earnings. From panel B, it is shown that current operating accruals, non-current 
operating  accruals  and  retained  cash  flows  increase  monotonically  across  deciles.  In 
particular, current operating accruals increase from about a mean (median) of -0.065 (-0.043) 
in  the  lowest  portfolio  to  0.099  (0.075)  in  the  highest  portfolio.  Non-current  operating 
accruals increase from about a mean (median) of -0.088 (-0.057) in the lowest portfolio to 
0.259 (0.237). Moreover, the lowest decile has a mean (median) value of retained cash flows 
equal to -0.078 (-0.042), while the highest decile has a mean (median) value of retained cash 
flows equal to 0.083 (0.037). In contrast, the components of distributed earnings decrease 
across  deciles.  Specifically,  cash  flows  distributed  to  debt-holders  decrease  from  about  a 
mean  (median)  of  0.077  (0.043)  in  the  lowest  portfolio  to  -0.212  (-0.195)  in  the  highest 
portfolio.  Finally,  the  mean  (median)  value  of  cash  flows  distributed  to  equity  holders 
decrease from 0.009 (0.005) for the lowest decile to -0.173 (-0.121) for the highest decile. 
 
5.2  Persistence Results 
 
  Table  4  presents  the  results  on  the  persistence  coefficients  of  earnings  and  its   15 
components.    We  use  the  seemingly  unrelated  regression  (SUR)  method  to  control  for 
possible cross sectional correlation and variance heterogeneity across firms.
13  
  The first column of table 4 presents results from a simple autoregression on earnings 
performance.  Consistent  with  prior  research,  profitability  is  slow  mean  reverting  with  a 
coefficient  1 a  equal to 0.714. The respective t-statistic strongly rejects the null hypothesis 
that  profitability  is  purely  transitory.    Column  2  of  table  4  shows  results  based  on  the 
decomposition  of  net  income  into  total  accruals  and  free  cash  flows.    The  persistence 
coefficient on total accruals ( 1 a  = 0.655) is less than the persistence coefficient on free cash 
flows  ( 2 a  =  0.749),  confirming  the  well-known  findings  that  the  accrual  component  of 
earnings  is  less  persistent  than  the  free  cash  flow  component  of  earnings.  A  test  on  the 
equality of the coefficients suggests a significant difference between accruals and free cash 
flows in their implications for future earnings performance.  
Column  3  of  table  4  presents  results  based  on  the  extended  decomposition  of 
earnings. Consistent with “RSTT 05”, the persistence coefficient of current operating accruals 
( 1 a  = 0.613) is less than that of non-current operating accruals ( 2 a  = 0.633). A test on the 
equality  of  the  coefficients  suggests  a  significant  difference  between  current  operating 
accruals  and  non  current  operating  accruals  in  their  implications  for  future  earnings 
performance (F = 11.22). This finding casts doubt on “FWY 03a” and “FWY 03b” conclusion 
that there are no significant differences between the persistence of current and non-current 
operating accruals. The persistence coefficient of non-current operating accruals ( 2 a  = 0.633) 
is also less than that of retained cash flows ( 3 a  = 0.745) with an F-test rejecting the null 
hypothesis  that  the  two  coefficients  are  equal.  In  addition,  the  persistence  coefficient  of 
earnings that are distributed to debt holders ( 4 a  = 0.669) is less than that of earnings that are 
distributed to equity holders ( 5 a  = 0.789) with an F-test rejecting the null hypothesis that the 
two coefficients are equal. Note that all the tabulated F-tests in column 3 of table 4 indicate 
the significance of differential persistence among all components of earnings based on our 
extended decomposition. Thus, these findings suggest that there are systematic differences in 
the persistence among the components of retained earnings and between the components of 
distributed earnings.  
In column 4 of table 4, profitability is disaggregated into retained and distributed 
earnings.  The results imply that the persistence coefficient of retained earnings ( 1 a  = 0.684) 
is less than that of distributed earnings ( 2 a  = 0.761).  The null hypothesis of equality between 
                                                 
13 In supplemental tests we perform analysis using the Fama-Mc Beth (1973) procedure, by estimating 
annual regressions and obtaining t-values based on the mean and standard deviations of coefficient 
estimates.  The results remain similar with respect to these procedures.   16 
the two persistence coefficients is strongly rejected. These findings indicate that total retained 
earnings are less persistent than total distributed earnings. 
 
5.3  Pricing Results 
 
In this section we present pricing tests to investigate the degree to which the information 
about the persistence of the component of earnings is reflected in stock prices. The test is 
developed by Mishkin (1983)
14 and is based on the basic implications of market efficiency 
that abnormal returns are zero in expectation: 
( ) 0 1 = + t t F ARET E                                                                                      (9) 
And a model that satisfies the efficient market condition in (9): 
( ) ( ) 1 1 1 1 +
∗
+ + + + Χ − Χ = t t t F ARET ε β τ τ                                                                         (10) 
where  1 + t ARET   is the abnormal return from time t to time t+1.  t F  is the information set 
(publicly available) at the end of period t.  1 + t X  is a variable relevant for the valuation of the 
stock at time t. 
∗
+1 t X  is the rational forecast of  1 + t X  at time t. ε  is the disturbance with the 
property  ( ) 0 1 = + t t F E ε  and β  is the valuation response coefficient. 
The  implication  of  market  efficiency  highlighted  by  this  model  is  that  only 
unanticipated  changes  in  1 + t X  can  be  correlated  with  ( ) t t F ARET 1 + .  In  the  model,  the 
relevant variable X  is earnings and β  is the earnings response coefficient. Therefore, one 
can  estimate  a  system  by  combining  the  specification  of  each  forecasting  equation 
(decomposition of earnings) in table 4 and the rational pricing model in equation (10). 
This  framework  allows  us  to  simultaneously  estimate  the  actual  persistence 
parameters (forecasting coefficients) of the component of earnings with the corresponding 
persistence parameters (valuation coefficients).  The two equations of each system are first 
jointly estimated by imposing no constraints on the forecasting and valuation coefficients. To 
test whether the forecasting are significantly different from the valuation coefficients obtained 
before,  the  two  equations  of  each  system  are  jointly  estimated  by  imposing  the  rational 
pricing constraints. The following  likelihood ratio statistic is distributed asymptotically as 
( ) q x
2 , under the null hypothesis of market efficiency:  
n 2 log ( )
U C SSR SSR /  
                                                 
14 For  further  details  on  this  framework,  see  Mishkin  (1983),  and  Abel  and  Mishkin  (1983).  This 
framework has been implemented in Sloan (1996), “FWY 03a” and “DRS 06” studies.   17 
where  q  is  the  number  of  rational  pricing  constraints,  n  is  the  number  of  observations. 
C SSR  and 
u SSR  are  the  sum  of  squared  residuals  from  the  constrained  and  the 
unconstrained systems. 
Table 5 reports the estimation results of the four systems from the combination of 
each decomposition of earnings and the rational pricing model in equation (10)
15. Note that all 
persistence parameters are identical in magnitude to those in table 4. 
 Panel  A  of table 5 presents the results from a simple autoregression  on  earnings 
performance. The valuation coefficient of earnings (
∗
1 a = 0.798) is higher than the forecasting 
coefficient ( 1 a = 0.714). Market efficiency implies that the valuation coefficient should be 
equal to the forecasting coefficient ( 1 1 a a =
∗ ). The likelihood test for market efficiency is 
27.30 rejecting the null hypothesis of market efficiency. This finding indicates that the post 
announcement drift is unique to quarterly earnings changes. It is also in contrary with Sloan 
(1996) finding, that investors correctly anticipate the average persistence of current earnings 
performance, instead suggesting that they overestimate it.  
Panel B of Table 5 provides the results based on the decomposition of earnings into 
total accruals and free cash flows. The implied persistence parameter on total accruals (
∗
1 a  = 
0.887), exceeds its actual persistence parameter ( 1 a = 0.655).  This suggests that investors 
overestimate total accruals relative to its ability to predict future profitability that is consistent 
with the findings in Sloan (1996).  Statistically, the apparent overestimation of total accruals 
is significant with likelihood ratio statistic being 148.07. The valuation coefficient of free 
cash flows, however, is similar to the forecasting coefficient.  The null hypothesis of rational 
pricing of free cash flows cannot be rejected.  Moreover, a test of overall market efficiency 
( 1 1 a a =
∗ , 2 2 a a =
∗ )  suggests  that  we  are  able  to  reject  the  null  hypothesis  that  investors 
rationally price total accruals and free cash flows. In addition, a test of difference in valuation 
of  total  accruals  and  free  cash  flows  indicates  that  investors  distinguish  between  their 
different implications for future profitability. Thus, the findings in panels A and B appear to 
be  in  contrary  with  Sloan  (1996)  findings  that  investors  fixate  on  earnings,  failing  to 
distinguish between the different properties of the accrual and free cash flow component of 
earnings.  Instead, investors overestimate the persistence coefficient of total accruals not only 
higher than its true coefficient but also higher than that of the free cash flow. 
Panel C provides our main results based on the extended decomposition of earnings. 
For  the  components  of  retained  earnings,  the  persistence  coefficients  of  current  operating 
                                                 
15 In supplemental tests we perform analysis using the Fama-Mc Beth (1973) procedure, by estimating 
annual regressions, obtaining t-values based on the mean and standard deviations of the coefficient 
estimates  and  taking  the  time  series  of  differences  between  the  coefficients  estimates  from  the 
forecasting and valuation equations. The results remain similar with respect to these procedures.   18 
accruals, non-current operating accruals and retained cash holding are 0.613, 0.633 and 0.745 
respectively.    Investors  significantly  overestimate  the  persistence  of  current  operating 
accruals, non-current operating accruals and retained cash holding, with valuation coefficients 
at  0.856,  0.842  and  0.875.  To  test  for  differential  severity  in  the  implied  persistence 
parameters of current operating accruals, non current operating accruals and retained cash 
holdings  we  impose  also  the  rational  pricing  constraint  (
∗ ∗ ∗ = = 3 2 1 a a a )  and  find  with 
likelihood ratio statistic of 1.52 that investors act as if all components of retained earnings 
have similar implications for future profitability. 
For  the  components  of  distributed  earnings,  however,  stock  prices  behave  as  if 
investors correctly anticipate the persistence of cash flows distributed to debt-holders with a 
pricing coefficient of 0.664 versus the actual persistence coefficient of 0.669 and significantly 
underestimate  the  persistence  of  cash  flows  distributed  to  equity  holders  with  a  pricing 
coefficient of 0.713 versus the actual persistence coefficient of 0.789.  To test for equality in 
the valuation coefficients of cash distributions to debt holders and equity holders we impose 
also the rational pricing constraint (
∗ ∗ = 5 4 a a ) and find with likelihood ratio statistic of 3.54 
that  investors  act  as  if  both  components  of  distributed  earnings  have  similar  levels  of 
persistence.  A  test  on  overall  market  efficiency  ( 1 1 a a =
∗ , 2 2 a a =
∗ , 
3 3 a a =
∗ , 4 4 a a =
∗ , 5 5 a a =
∗ ) rejects the null hypothesis that the market rationally prices all the 
components of earnings performance.  
In summary, the above results suggest the market overestimates the persistence of 
current operating accruals, non-current operating accruals and retained cash flows. They also 
cast  doubt  on  prior  research  treatment  of  accruals  and  free  cash  flows  as  completely 
homogenous  components  of  earnings.  In  contrast,  the  findings  suggest  that  investors 
overestimate the sustainability of current earnings performance due to the fact that they do not 
distinguish  and  similarly  price  the  differential  persistence  of  the  distinct  components  of 
retained  earnings.  This  result  is  consistent  with  investor’s  limited  attention  or  limited 
processing power on earnings management or firm’s business conditions. Our findings also 
suggest that investors behave as if both components of distributed earnings have similar levels 
of persistence, leading to a correct anticipation of the lower persistence of cash distributions 
to debt holders and an underestimation of the higher persistence cash distributions to equity 
holders. 
Panel  D  presents  results  for  the  new  decomposition  into  retained  and  distributed 
earnings.  The  implied  persistence  coefficient  on  retained  earnings  at  0.865  is  statistically 
higher than its corresponding actual persistence coefficient at 0.684. Moreover, the valuation   19 
coefficient of distributed earnings is statistically significantly lower than its corresponding 
persistence coefficient. These findings confirm the results in Panel C. 
 
5.4  Stock Return Results 
 
The results from our pricing tests suggest that abnormal returns could be generated by 
exploiting investors’ inability to correctly anticipate the persistence of retained earnings and 
the persistence of cash distributions to equity holders. In particular, a trading strategy taking a 
long (short) position in firms that report low (high) retained earnings could generate positive 
abnormal returns. Moreover, a trading strategy taking a long (short) position in firms that 
report  high  (low)  distributed  earnings  to  equity  holders  could  generate  positive  abnormal 
returns. Therefore,  the  economic  significance  of  the  above  anomalies  can  be  assessed  by 
investigating the returns of trading strategies based on the magnitude of retained earnings and 
cash  distributions  to  equity  holders.  For  this  purpose  we  rank  firms  annually  on  retained 
earnings and distributed earnings to equity holders, and then allocate them into ten equal-
sized  portfolios  (deciles)  based  on  these  ranks. Then,  we  compute  future  abnormal  (size-
adjusted)  returns  for  each  portfolio  for  each  of  the  40  years  in  our  sample.  Finally,  we 
compute  the  hedge  portfolio  returns  for  the  trading  strategies  based  on  the  magnitude  of 
retained earnings and cash distributions to equity holders. 
Table 6 presents the average of the 40 annual abnormal returns for each portfolio 
based on the magnitude of retained earnings and cash distributions to equity holders, along 
with their associated t-statistics. From the first column of table 6 consistent with previous 
results, we find that there is a negative relation across deciles based on the  magnitude  of 
retained earnings and abnormal returns. The abnormal returns range from 8.4 % (t=2.926) for 
the lowest portfolio based to -7.2% (t=-4.81) for the highest portfolio. The return to a hedge 
portfolio consisting of a long position in the lowest decile and a short position in the highest 
decile  is  equal  to  15.6  %  (t=4.822).  From  the  second  column  of  table  6  consistent  with 
previous results, we find that there is a positive relation across deciles based on the magnitude 
of distributed earnings to equity holders and abnormal returns. Although the relationship is 
not linear, still the abnormal returns range from -5% (t=-2.131) for the lowest portfolio to 
4.2% (t=4.722) for the highest portfolio. The return to a hedge portfolio consisting of a long 
position  in  the  highest  decile  and  a  short  position  in  the  lowest  decile  is  equal  to  9.2% 
(t=3.375). Therefore, the average profit from a portfolio strategy based on the magnitude of 
retained earnings is 71.1% higher than that based on the magnitude of distributed earnings to   20 
equity holders. However, in unreported tests we find that the difference between the abnormal 
returns generated from the two strategies (6.4 %) is not statistically significant (t=1.313)
16. 
Figures  1  and  2  provide  evidence  on  the  stability  of  the  abnormal  returns  to  the 
trading strategies. Figure 1 plots the annual hedge portfolio abnormal returns generated from 
the trading strategy based on the magnitude of retained earnings.  The hedge portfolio return 
is positive in 36 of the 40 years examined, illustrating that the relation is fairly stable over 
time.  Figure 2 plots the annual hedge portfolio abnormal returns generated from the trading 
strategy based on the magnitude of distributed earnings to equity holders, broken down by 
year.  The strategy is profitable in the great majority of years (32 out of 40).       
 
5.5  Retained Earnings vs. Total Accruals 
 
In this section, we investigate whether retained earnings reflect more information than 
total accruals about the degree to which the sustainability of current earnings performance 
provokes excessive investor optimism. Table 7 provides results from a test conducted with the 
Mishkin  approach  on  whether  the  market  efficiently  valuates  the  implications  of  retained 
earnings and distributed earnings for future profitability, after controlling for total accruals
17. 
It  is  shown  that  the  valuation  coefficient  of  retained  earnings  is  0.875,  statistically 
significantly higher than its persistence coefficient at 0.744.
18  The valuation coefficient of 
distributed  earnings  at  0.700  is  statistically  lower  than  its  corresponding  persistence 
coefficient at 0.751.  In addition, the implied persistence parameter on total accruals is -0.014, 
insignificant  and  lower  than  its  corresponding  actual  persistence  parameter  at  -0.088.  
However, we impose the rational pricing constraint ( )
∗ ∗ = 3 1 a a  and find with a likelihood ratio 
statistic of 450.65 no similarities between the implied persistence coefficients of total accruals 
and retained earnings. Furthermore, we find with a likelihood ratio statistic of 114.46 that the 
overestimation of the persistence of retained earnings ( 1 1 a a −
∗ = 0.131) is significantly higher 
than the overestimation of the persistence of total accruals ( 3 3 a a −
∗ = 0.074).  These findings 
indicate  that  when  total  accruals  are  included  as  control  variable,  investors  distinguish 
between the implications of retained earnings and total accruals for future profitability and 
overestimate the persistence of retained earnings significantly higher than they overestimate 
                                                 
16 The results are available from the authors on request. 
17 A similar test has been conducted in Hirshleifer, Hou, Teoh and Zhang (2004) to investigate whether 
the market efficiently valuates the implications of accruals and cash flows for future profitability, after 
controlling for the level of net operating assets. 
18 In supplemental tests we perform analysis using the Fama-Mc Beth (1973) procedure, by estimating 
annual regressions, obtaining t-values based on the mean and standard deviations of the coefficient 
estimates  and  taking  the  time  series  of  differences  between  the  coefficients  estimates  from  the 
forecasting and valuation equations. The results remain similar with respect to these procedures.   21 
the persistence of total accruals. In other words, investors view retained earnings much too 
positively  than  total  accruals  in  forecasting  future  profitability.  Therefore,  our  evidence 
indicates that retained earnings is a more comprehensive measure of investor overestimation 
about the sustainability of current earnings performance that captures information beyond that 
contained in total accruals. 
 
5.6  Retained Earnings vs. Distributed Earnings to Equity Holders 
 
So far, the anomalies on retained earnings and distributed earnings to equity holders 
have  been  examined  independently  from  each  other.  In  the  accounting  literature,  more 
attention has been paid to the accruals anomaly while in the finance literature, recent studies 
suggest returns after stock repurchase are high, and returns after stock issues are low.
19  In 
order to investigate the extent to which these two anomalies overlap with or differ from each 
other  we  consider  control  hedge,  non-overlap  hedge  and  joint  hedge  strategies.
20  To 
implement these two-dimensional strategies, we sort stocks into three groups, the bottom 20 
percent  (Group  1),  middle  60  percent  (Group  2),  and  top  20  percent  (Group  3)  for  both 
retained  earnings and distributed earnings to equity holders. Thus, firms are assigned into 
three  final  quintiles  based  on  retained  earnings  ( ( ) 1 t RE ,  ( ) 2 t RE ,  ( ) 3 t RE )  and  cash 
distributions to equityholders ( ( ) 1 _ t E DIST ,  ( ) 2 _ t E DIST ,   ( ) 3 _ t E DIST )
21. 
 Panel A of Table 8 presents the average of the 40 annual abnormal (size-adjusted) 
returns  for  each  quintile,  along  with  their  associated  t-statistics.  Consistent  with  prior 
findings,  the  unconditional  hedge  return  for  retained  earnings  is  equal  to  11.2%  and 
statistically  significant  (t=4.974).  For  distributed  earnings  to  equity  holders,  it  is  equal  to 
6.4%  and  statistically  significant  (t=2.83).  In  unreported  tests,  however,  the  difference 
between the two generated hedge returns (4.8 %) is not statistically significant (t=1.345)
22.  
Panel B of Table 8 reports the abnormal returns for each combination derived from 
the  intersection  of  these  quintiles,  along  with  their  associated  t-statistics.  Note  that  the 
reported  abnormal  returns  are  generally  statistically  significant  except  for  the  extreme 
( ( ) 1 t RE ,  ( ) 1 _ t E DIST  and ( ( ) 3 t RE ,  ( ) 3 _ t E DIST   intersections. 
Under the control hedge strategies, we assess whether the effect of retained earnings 
survives after holding the effect of distributed earnings to equity holders constant and vice-
                                                 
19 Ritter (2003) has an excellent survey on this topic. 
20 Collins and Hribar (2002) and Desai, Rajcopal and Venkatachalam (2004) have used this approach to 
address different questions. 
21Using quintile analysis leads to lower standard errors in t-statistics for hedge returns across  two-
dimensional strategies than decile analysis. This approach has been also used by other studies in the 
accounting and the finance literature. However, the results are qualitatively similar with decile analysis. 
22 The results are available from the authors on request.   22 
versa.  . The abnormal returns to the control hedge strategies are reported in panel C of table 
8. The generated abnormal returns from the strategy on retained earnings are 7.7% (t=2.239), 
9.9% (t=3.545) and 8.8% (t=4.046) across ( ) 1 _ t E DIST , ( ) 2 _ t E DIST  and  ( ) 3 _ t E DIST  
quintiles, respectively. Thus, the strategy on retained earnings is profitable, after controlling 
for distributed earnings to equityholders. On the other hand the strategy on cash distributions 
to equity holders does not generate significant abnormal returns across  ( ) 1 t RE  and  ( ) 2 t RE  
quintiles. Note also, that the control hedge return of the strategy for firms with high retained 
earnings ( ( ) 3 t RE  ) quintile is positive (4.6%) and statistically significant (t=1.904) only at 
the 10% level. Thus, cash distributions to equity holders are not significantly related with 
future returns, after controlling for retained earnings. 
Under  the  non-overlap  hedge  strategy,  we  assess  whether  the  effect  of  retained 
earnings survives over the effect of distributed earnings to equity holders and vice-versa, after 
eliminating firms in convergent extreme intersections where the two anomalies have the same 
prediction. Thus, for retained  earnings we form a non-overlap hedge strategy for retained 
earnings  without considering firms in the ( ( ) 1 t RE , ( ) 3 _ t E DIST ) intersection as well as 
firms in the ( ( ) 3 t RE , ( ) 1 _ t E DIST ) intersection. Similarly, we form a non-overlap hedge 
strategy  for  cash  distributions  on  equity  holders  after  eliminating  firms  in  the 
( ( ) 3 _ t E DIST , ( ) 1 t RE )  intersection  as  well  as  firms  in  the  ( ( ) 1 _ t E DIST ( ) 3 t RE ) 
intersection. The abnormal returns to the non-overlap hedge strategies are reported in panel D 
of Table 8. We see that the abnormal return earned from the non-overlap hedge strategy on 
retained  earnings  is  positive  (8.6%)  and  statistically  significant  (t=2.956).  However,  the 
generated abnormal return from the non-overlap hedge strategy on cash distributions to equity 
holders is not statistically significant. Thus, cash distributions to equity holders do not have 
predictive  power  for  future  returns,  after  eliminating  firms  in  convergent  extreme 
intersections where the two anomalies have the same prediction.  
Under the joint hedge strategy, we assess whether the combination of the two effects, 
reveals a more extreme form of market mispricing, than of each effect alone. Panel E of table 
8  reports  a  joint  hedge  strategy  on  retained  earnings  and  distributed  earnings  to  equity 
holders.  The  hedge  return  of  joint  strategy  taking  a  long  position  in  the 
( ( ) 1 t RE , ( ) 3 _ t E DIST )  intersection  and  a  short  position  in  the  intersection 
( ( ) 3 t RE , ( ) 1 _ t E DIST ) is positive (13.5%) and statistically significant (t=6.435). Note, that 
the difference between the generated hedge returns from the joint strategy and the strategy on 
retained earnings only is 2.3% and not statistically significant (t=1.001), while the difference 
between  the  generated  hedge  returns  from  the  joint  strategy  and  the  strategy  on  cash   23 
distributions to equity holders only is 7.1% and statistically significant (t=3.748). Thus, a joint 
strategy that exploits both anomalies generates larger abnormal returns than those associated 
only with cash distributions to equity holders. 
In summary, our evidence indicates that the anomaly on distributed earnings to equity 
holders found in the finance literature is subsumed by the anomaly on retained earnings. Note 
that  while  we  have  not  yet  assess  the  sources  of  this  mispricing,  our  findings  suggest  a 
simplified representation of the accrual anomaly documented in the accounting literature and 
the  anomaly  on  distributed  capital  (dividends  minus  net  stock  issues)  documented  in  the 
finance literature as a manifestation of a general market mispricing on retained earnings.  
 
5.7  Decomposition of Retained Earnings 
 
The  anomaly  on  retained  earnings  could  be  consistent  with  investor’s  limited 
attention  or limited processing power on  earnings  management  or on adverse  information 
about  firm’s  business  conditions.  In  order  to  distinguish  between  these  two  competing 
hypotheses, we decompose retained earnings into their discretionary and non discretionary 
portions and examine their hedge portfolio returns.
23  The discretionary portion captures the 
impact of managerial manipulation while the non discretionary portion captures the impact of 
business conditions. Thus, if the anomaly is consistent with investor’s limited attention or 
limited processing power on earnings management, we should find positive abnormal returns 
only on a hedge portfolio strategy taking a long (short) position on low (high) discretionary 
retained  earnings.  If  the  anomaly  is  driven  from  investor  inability  to  understand  firm’s 
business  conditions,  then  positive  hedge  abnormal  returns  should  be  earned  only  from  a 
strategy  taking  a  long  (short)  position  on  low  (high)  non  discretionary  retained  earnings. 
However,  we  investigate  also  the  contribution  of  an  interaction  term  between  the 
discretionary and non discretionary portion of retained earnings in the generation of hedge 
portfolio abnormal returns, since we recognize that the two hypotheses might not be mutually 
exclusive and probably co-exist.  
For the decomposition, we use the model of “CCJL 06”
24 that is based on the idea 
that  the  expected  levels  of  net  operating  assets  and  financial  assets  (cash  and  cash 
equivalents) of a firm are closely related to the level of current sales  t S  as follows
25: 
                                                 
23 The method of decomposing earnings into their discretionary and non discretionary portions is often 
used in the accounting literature to detect earnings management (see Jones, 1991). However, it is a 
controversial issue since any misspecification in the decomposition introduces measurement errors in 
each estimated portion (see, Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995, Guay, Kothari and Watts, 1996 and 
Kothari, 2005).  
24 Xie (2001) uses  the  Jones  (1991) model  to decompose  accruals  into their  discretionary  and non 
discretionary components and find results similar to ours. In the Jones (1991) model, non discretionary   24 
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In the above equations, the levels of net operating assets and financial assets are assumed to 
be stable proportions of firm sales. To smooth out transitory fluctuations in these relations we 
estimate these proportions as the ratios of a moving average of the past five years of the actual 
levels of net operating assets and financial assets to a moving average of the past five years of 
sales. Then, the non discretionary portion of retained earnings that reflects firm’s business 
conditions is defined as the difference between the expected levels of net operating assets and 
financial assets and their most recent actual levels: 
( ) ( ) 1 1 − − − + − = t t t t t t t C C E NOA NOA E NDRE                                                                   (18) 
The  discretionary  portion  of  retained  earnings  that  captures  earnings  management  is  then 
defined  as  the  difference  between  the  current  actual  levels  of  net  operating  assets  and 
financial assets and their expected levels:   
( ) ( ) t t t t t t t C E C NOA E NOA DRE − + − =                                                                         (19) 
In Table 9 we report the average of the 36 annual abnormal returns for each portfolio 
based on the magnitude of the discretionary portion of retained earnings, non discretionary 
portion of retained earnings and the interaction term between the two portions
26. The first 
column  on  table  9  reports  that  there  is  a  negative  relation  across  deciles  based  on  the 
magnitude  of  discretionary  retained  earnings  and  abnormal  returns.  The  abnormal  returns 
range from 5.5% (t=3.132) for the lowest portfolio based to -4.8% (t=-3.453) for the highest 
portfolio. The return to a hedge portfolio consisting of a long position in the lowest decile and 
a short position in the highest decile is equal to 10.3% (t=5.516). Moreover, Figure 3 indicates 
that this negative relation is fairly stable over time since the hedge portfolio return is positive 
in 31 of the 36 years examined. However, the results on the second column of Table 9 show 
that the hedge portfolio return based on non discretionary retained  earnings is negative (-
2.7%) and statistically insignificant (t=-1.455). Finally, from the results on the third column 
                                                                                                                                        
(discretionary) accruals are modeled as the fitted values (residuals) regressions of accruals on variables 
that capture firm’s business conditions such as sales growth. However, in our work we follow the 
approach of “CCJL 06”, since we recognize that few firms have sufficiently long time series to ensure 
a reliable estimation of a regression model to extract the discretionary and non discretionary portion of 
each component of retained earnings. 
25 Sales  t S  are measured with Compustat data item 12 
26 The sample for these tests consists of firms for a 36-year period from 1967 to 2003 due to the data 
requirements for the estimation of the two portions.   25 
of  Table  9  we  observe  that  the  hedge  portfolio  return  on  the  interaction  term  is  positive 
(3.5%) and statistically significant (t=1.893) only at the 10% level. 
In  summary,  the  above  results  are  consistent  with  the  earnings  management 
hypothesis  but  in  contrast  with  the  hypothesis  associated  with  adverse  information  about 
firm’s business conditions. This suggests that the anomaly on retained earnings arises from 
investor’s limited attention managerial violation of accounting rules and managerial empire 
building  tendencies  and  limited  cognitive  power  to  assess  separately  the  the  different 
implications  of  the  components  of  retained  earnings  for  future  profitability.    The 
results from the interaction term indicate in some cases the two hypotheses  might not be 
mutually exclusive and probably co-exist. However, the evidence is not particularly strong.  
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
Sloan (1996) in his seminal paper shows that investors overestimate (underestimate) 
the lower (higher) persistence of the accruals (cash flows). Kothari (2001) documents that a 
central puzzle in capital market based accounting research, is to understand this conflicting 
market’s reaction to the accrual and cash flow component of earnings. In order to assess this 
issue,  we  focus  on  retained  and  distributed  earnings.  The  results  indicate  that  there  are 
systematic  differences  in  the  persistence  among  the  components  of  retained  earnings  and 
between  the  components  of  distributed  earnings.  The  overall  sustainability  of  retained 
earnings is less than that of distributed earnings. However, investors act as if the components 
of  retained  earnings  have  similar  implications  for  future  profitability,  leading  to  an 
overvaluation  of  their  differential  persistence.  Moreover,  the  paper  shows  that  investors 
anticipate  correctly  the  lower  persistence  of  cash  distributions  to  debt  holders  and 
underestimate only the higher persistence of cash distributions to equity holders.  Both of 
these results are consistent with the accounting literature on accruals as well as the finance 
literature on the net stock issuances anomaly.  
The  economic  significance  of  the  two  anomalies  is  evaluated  with  the  positive 
abnormal returns earned from hedge portfolio strategies based on the magnitude of retained 
earnings and cash distributions to equity holders. However, our results on the association of 
the  two  anomalies  suggest  that  the  anomaly  on  retained  earnings  largely  subsumes  the 
anomaly on cash  distributions to  equity  holders.  Additional tests also show that retained 
earnings  reflect  more  information  than  total  accruals  about  the  degree  to  which  the 
sustainability of current earnings performance provokes excessive investor optimism. Thus, 
our evidence suggests that the accrual anomaly documented in the accounting literature and 
the anomaly on cash distributions to equity holders (or net stock issues) shown in the finance   26 
literature are a special case of a larger anomaly on retained earnings.  
Our  results  on  the  source  of  the  anomaly  on  retained  earnings  suggest  that  it  is 
primary attributable to investor’s limited attention on managerial empire building tendencies 
and managerial violation of accounting rules.   To the extent that the anomaly on retained 
earnings captures the same market inefficiency with the anomaly on distributed earnings to 
equity holders, they are more likely to result from investors with limited cognitive ability in 
understanding the  implications of  managerial  decisions.  It would be  more  interesting for 
future research to examine in detail how investors misunderstand the different persistence of 
the components of earnings.   27 
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Table 1: Univariate Statistics 
Parameter   Mean   Median  St. Dev.  Skewness  Kurtosis 
t NI   0.003  0.042  0.177  -3.314  20.110 
t CACC   0.013  0.008  0.105  -0.249  15.328 
t NCACC   0.045  0.025  0.158  0.726  11.453 
t TACC   0.058  0.044  0.199  0.208  8.939 
t FCF   -0.049  -0.008  0.210  -1.780  11.156 
t C ∆   0.004  0.001  0.127  0.277  18.362 
t D DIST _   -0.027  -0.002  0.134  -1.071  14.277 
t E DIST _   -0.022  0.003  0.141  -2.986  18.450 
t RE   0.061  0.049  0.233  0.223  8.885 
t DIST   -0.049  -0.006  0.195  -2.007  12.139 
t EXRET   0.006  -0.049  0.647  5.911  99.788 
 
Table 2: Correlation Matrix (Pearson)
∗ 
Parameter 
t NI   t CACC   t NCACC   t TACC   t FCF   t C ∆   t D DIST _   t E DIST _  
t RE   t DIST   t ARET  
t NI   1  0.265  0.223  0.316  0.534  0.387  0.044  0.406  0.499  0.332  0.019 
t CACC   0.265  1  0.107  0.61  -0.315  -0.101  -0.279  -0.091  0.461  -0.264  -0.016 
t NCACC   0.223  0.107  1  0.854  -0.578  -0.024  -0.562  -0.266  0.716  -0.59  -0.05 
t TACC   0.316  0.61  0.854  1  -0.634  -0.072  -0.602  -0.263  0.813  -0.616  -0.048 
t FCF   0.534  -0.315  -0.578  -0.634  1  0.393  0.621  0.571  -0.328  0.833  0.057 
t C ∆   0.387  -0.101  -0.024  -0.072  0.393  1  -0.039  -0.203  0.522  -0.18  -0.02 
t D DIST _   0.044  -0.279  -0.562  -0.602  0.621  -0.039  1  0.02  -0.538  0.694  0.042 
t E DIST _   0.406  -0.091  -0.266  -0.263  0.571  -0.203  0.02  1  -0.352  0.733  0.053 
t RE   0.499  0.461  0.716  0.813  -0.328  0.522  -0.538  -0.352  1  -0.652  -0.053 
t DIST   0.332  -0.264  -0.59  -0.616  0.833  -0.18  0.694  0.733  -0.652  1  0.068 
t ARET   0.019  -0.016  -0.05  -0.048  0.057  -0.02  0.042  0.053  -0.053  0.068  1 
 
                                                 
∗ Notes: 
  Bold numbers indicate significance at less than 5% level.   31 




Decile Portfolios Sorted by Retained Earnings  t RE  
 
Parameter  Lowest  2
nd Decile  3
rdDecile  4
th Decile  5
th Decile  6
th Decile  7
th Decile   8
th Decile  9
th Decile  Highest 
 
Panel A : Components of Earnings  t NI  
 





































































































































Panel B : Components of Retained Earnings  t RE  
 



























































































Panel C : Components of Distributed Earnings  t DIST  
 




























































                                                 
∗ Notes: 
  Bold numbers indicate significance at less than 5% level.   32 
Table 4: Main Persistence Results 
∗ 
1 1 0 1 + + + + = t t t u NI a a NI  (1) 
1 2 1 0 1 + + + + + = t t t u FCF a TACC a a NI  (2) 
1 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 _ _ + + + + + ∆ + + + = t t t t t t t u E DIST a D DIST a C a NCACC a CACC a a NI  (3) 
1 2 1 0 1 + + + + + = t t t t u DIST a RE a a NI  (4)
   
Parameters  1  2  3  4 








t NI   0.714 
(223.52)       
t TACC     0.655 
(184.47)     
t FCF     0.749 
(227.04) 
   
t CACC       0.613 
(115.23) 
 
t NCACC       0.633 
(143.00) 
 
t C ∆       0.745 
(166.73) 
 
t D DIST _       0.669 
(133.27) 
 
t E DIST _       0.789 
(204.82) 
 
t RE         0.684 
(206.56) 
t DIST         0.761 
(216.92) 
F-Tests         
2 1 a a =     F=1368.32  F=11.22  F=979.28 
3 1 a a =       F=503.04   
4 1 a a =       F=100.15   
5 1 a a =       F=989.91   
3 2 a a =       F=459.03   
4 2 a a =       F=86.48   
5 2 a a =       F=1340.87   
4 3 a a =       F=183.97   
5 3 a a =       F=92.07   
5 4 a a =       F=568.60   
Adjusted R
2  0.436  0.448  0.453  0.445 
                                                 
∗ Notes: 
  Associated t-statistics are reported in parenthesis and bold numbers indicate significance at 
less than 5% level.   33 




1 1 0 1 + + + + = t t t u NI a a NI   
( ) 1 1 0 1 1 +
∗
+ + + − − = t t t t NI a a NI ARET ε β  
 
  Persistence Coefficients  Valuation Coefficients 
Parameters  Estimate  St. Error  T-Statistics  Parameters  Estimate  St. Error  T-Statistics 
t NI   0.714  0.003  223.52  t NI   0.798  0.016  50.51 
Null Hypotheses   Likelihood Ratio Statistic  Marginal Significance Level 
∗ = 1 1 a a   27.30  0.000 
 
Panel B 
1 2 1 0 1 + + + + + = t t t t u FCF a TACC a a NI  
( ) 1 2 1 0 1 1 +
∗ ∗
+ + + − − − = t t t t t FCF a TACC a a NI ARET ε β  
 
  Persistence Coefficients  Valuation Coefficients 
Parameters  Estimate  St. Error  T-Statistics  Parameters  Estimate  St. Error  T-Statistics 
t TACC   0.655  0.003  184.47  t TACC   0.887  0.019  47.27 
t FCF   0.749  0.003  227.04  t FCF   0.752  0.017  44.58 
Null Hypotheses  Likelihood Ratio Statistic  Marginal Significance Level 
∗ = 1 1 a a   148.07  0.000 
∗ = 2 2 a a   0.026  0.871 
∗ = 1 1 a a  and 
∗ = 2 2 a a   287.64  0.000 
∗ ∗ = 2 1 a a   95.23  0.000 
 
                                                 
Notes: 
  Bold numbers indicate significance at less than 5% level. 
 




1 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 _ _ + + + + + ∆ + + + = t t t t t t u E DIST a D DIST a C a NCACC a CACC a a NI  
( ) 1 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 1 _ _ +
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
+ + + − − ∆ − − − − = t t t t t t t E DIST a D DIST a C a NCACC a CACC a a NI ARET ε β
 
  Persistence Coefficients  Valuation Coefficients 
Parameters  Estimate  St. Error  T-Statistics  Parameters  Estimate  St. Error  T-Statistics 
t CACC   0.613  0.005  115.23  t CACC   0.856  0.028  30.69 
t NCACC   0.633  0.004  143.00  t NCACC   0.842  0.023  36.43 
t C ∆   0.745  0.004  166.73  t C ∆   0.875  0.023  38.13 
t D DIST _   0.669  0.005  133.27  t D DIST _   0.664  0.026  25.64 
t E DIST _   0.789  0.004  204.82  t E DIST _   0.713  0.020  36.12 
Null Hypotheses   Likelihood Ratio Statistic  Marginal Significance Level 
∗ = 1 1 a a   73.33  0.000 
∗ = 2 2 a a   79.01  0.000 
∗ = 3 3 a a   30.91  0.000 
∗ = 4 4 a a   0.025  0.873 
∗ = 5 5 a a       14.07  0.000 
∗ = 1 1 a a , 
∗ = 2 2 a a ,
∗ = 3 3 a a , 
∗ = 4 4 a a and 
∗ = 5 5 a a  
344.95  0.000 
∗ ∗ = 2 1 a a   0.20  0.652 
∗ ∗ = 3 1 a a   0.39  0.531 
∗ ∗ = 3 2 a a   1.51  0.219 
∗ ∗ = 5 4 a a   3.54  0.060 
∗ ∗ ∗ = = 3 2 1 a a a   1.52  0.467 
∗ ∗ ∗ = = 5 4 3 a a a   65.38  0.000 
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ = = = = 5 4 3 2 1 a a a a a   153.18  0.000 
 
                                                 
∗  Notes: 
  Bold numbers indicate significance at less than 5% level. 




1 2 1 0 1 + + + + + = t t t t u DIST a RE a a NI  
( ) 1 2 1 0 1 1 +
∗ ∗
+ + + − − − = t t t t t DIST a RE a a NI ARET ε β  
 
  Persistence Coefficients  Valuation Coefficients 
Parameters  Estimate  St. Error  T-Statistics  Parameters  Estimate  St. Error  T-Statistics 
t RE   0.684  0.003  206.56  t RE   0.865  0.017  50.00 
t DIST   0.761  0.003  216.92  t DIST   0.701  0.018  39.05 
Null Hypotheses   Likelihood Ratio Statistic  Marginal Significance Level 
∗ = 1 1 a a   105.69  0.000 
∗ = 2 2 a a   10.66  0.001 
∗ = 1 1 a a  and 
∗ = 2 2 a a   331.51  0.000 
∗ ∗ = 2 1 a a   148.48  0.000 
 
                                                 
∗ Notes: 
  Bold numbers indicate significance at less than 5% level.    36 
Table 6: Stock Returns Results
∗ 
 
Deciles   
t RE  
 
t E DIST _  















































                                                 
∗ Notes: 
  Associated t-statistics are reported in parenthesis and bold numbers indicate significance at 
less than 5% level.    37 
Table 7: Retained Earnings vs. Total Accruals
∗ 
 
1 3 2 1 0 1 + + + + + + = t t t t t u TACC a DIST a RE a a NI  
 
 
  Persistence Coefficients  Valuation Coefficients 
Parameters  Estimate  St. Error  T-Statistics  Parameters  Estimate  St. Error  T-Statistics 
t RE   0.744  0.004  165.77  t RE   0.875  0.023  38.00 
t DIST   0.751  0.003  212.44  t DIST   0.700  0.018  38.60 
t TACC   -0.088  0.004  -19.65  t TACC   -0.014  0.022  -0.63 
Null Hypotheses  Likelihood Ratio Statistic  Marginal Significance Level 
∗ = 1 1 a a   31.16  0.000 
∗ = 2 2 a a   7.71  0.005 
∗ = 3 3 a a   9.98  0.002 
∗ = 1 1 a a ,
∗ = 3 3 a a   114.46  0.000 
∗ = 1 1 a a ,
∗ = 2 2 a a ,and
∗ = 3 3 a a   338.30  0.000 
∗ ∗ = 2 1 a a   61.65  0.000 
∗ ∗ = 3 1 a a   450.65  0.000 
∗ ∗ = 3 2 a a   692.18  0.000 
∗ ∗ ∗ = = 3 2 1 a a a   706.95  0.000 
  
 
                                                 
∗ Notes: Bold numbers indicate significance at less than 5% level. 
 
 
( ) 1 3 2 1 0 1 1 +
∗ ∗ ∗
+ + + − − − − = t t t t t t TACC a DIST a RE a a NI ARET ε β  38 
Table 8: Retained Earnings vs. Distributed Earnings to Equity Holders
∗ 
Panel A: Quintiles based  t RE  and  t E DIST _ . 
( ) 1 t RE   0.068 
(3.454) 
( ) 1 _ t E DIST   -0.032 
(-1.725) 
( ) 2 t RE   0.021 
(3.472) 
( ) 2 _ t E DIST   0.028 
(4.557) 
( ) 3 t RE   -0.044 
(-4.088) 
( ) 3 _ t E DIST   0.032 
(4.253) 
Hedge ( t RE )  0.112 
(4.974) 
Hedge ( t E DIST _ )  0.064 
(2.83) 
Panel B: Intersection of Quintiles based on  t RE and  t E DIST _ . 
Quintiles  ( ) 1 _ t E DIST   ( ) 2 _ t E DIST   ( ) 3 _ t E DIST  


















Panel C: Test-Statistics of Control Hedge Portfolio Strategies 
( ) 1 _ t E DIST  Constant: Hedge ( t RE )  0.077 
(2.239) 
( ) 1 t RE  Constant: Hedge ( t E DIST _ )  0.058 
(1.481) 
( ) 2 _ t E DIST  Constant: Hedge( t RE )  0.099 
(3.545) 
( ) 2 t RE  Constant: Hedge( t E DIST _ )  0.036 
(1.449) 
( ) 3 _ t E DIST  Constant: Hedge( t RE )  0.088 
(4.046) 
( ) 3 t RE  Constant: Hedge( t E DIST _ )  0.046 
(1.904) 
Panel D: Test- Statistics of Non-Overlap Hedge Portfolio Strategies 
Long Weighted Average of ( ) ( ) { } ( ) ( ) { } 2 _ , 1 & 1 _ , 1 t t t t E DIST RE E DIST RE   0.065 
(2.682) 
Short Weighted Average of ( ) ( ) { } ( ) ( ) { } 3 _ , 3 & 2 _ , 3 t t t t E DIST RE E DIST RE   -0.021 
(-2.44) 
Hedge ( t RE ) Non-Overlap Strategy  0.086 
(2.956) 
Long Weighted Average of ( ) ( ) { } ( ) ( ) { } 3 , 3 _ & 2 , 3 _ t t RE E DIST RE E DIST   0.02 
(2.449) 
Short Weighted Average of ( ) ( ) { } ( ) ( ) { } 2 , 1 _ & 1 , 1 _ t t RE E DIST RE E DIST   -0.003 
(-0.13) 
Hedge ( t E DIST _ ) Non-Overlap  Strategy  0.023 
(0.74) 
Panel E: Test-Statistic of a Joint ( ) t t E DIST RE _ ,  Hedge Portfolio Strategy 
Long on  ( ) ( ) { } 3 _ , 1 t t E DIST RE  & Short on  ( ) ( ) { } 1 _ , 3 t t E DIST RE   0.135 
(6.435) 
Difference between ( ) t t E DIST RE _ ,  and  t RE Hedge Strategy  0.023 
(1.001) 
Difference between ( ) t t E DIST RE _ ,  and  t E DIST _ Hedge Strategy  0.071 
(3.748) 
                                                 
∗ Notes: 
  Associated t-statistics are reported in parenthesis and bold numbers indicate significance at 
less than 5% level.    39 
Table 9: Returns from Retained Earnings Decomposition
∗ 
 
Deciles   
t DRE   t NDRE   Interaction Term 















































































                                                 
∗ Notes: 
  Associated t-statistics are reported in parenthesis and bold numbers indicate significance at 
less than 5% level.    40 
Figure 1: Hedge Portfolio Returns on Retained Earnings  













































































Figure 2: Hedge Portfolio Returns on Distributed Earnings to Equity holders
 













































































Figure 3: Hedge Portfolio Returns on Discretionary Retained Earnings  
Hedge Portfolio Abnormal Returns on Discretionary Retained  Earnings 
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